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Introduction
The idea of equipping a set of possible worlds, such as the interpretations of a classical logic language, with a complete pre-order is simple and useful for encod ing preferences or plausibility orderings. This idea has emerged in the late eighties for providing nonmonotonic consequence relations of the type "from p, q normally follows" requiring that all the most pre ferred/plausible/normal models of p be models of q [15] . Interestingly enough, possibility theory [17, 8] has been developed in the meantime, as a framework for modelling states of partial ignorance on the basis of possibility distributions encoding complete pre-orders. Then, possibility measures of events, defi ned as the maximum of the distribution over the set of models of the considered events, together with the dual mea sures of necessity, are used for assessing uncertainty. As such, possibility theory relies on a minimal speci fi city principle which states that the possibility level associated to a possible world should be the largest one which is compatible with the constraints represent ing the available information. It agrees in particular with the classical view of logical modelling according to which each of piece of information declares some worlds impossible (the others forming a subset of ten tatively possible ones). When pieces of information are conjunctively combined, the resulting set of the possi ble worlds is indeed the largest set compatible with all pieces of information. Possibility theory extends this view by allowing intermediary levels between what is fully possible and what is completely impossible.
More recently, the idea that there exist situations where the information could be bipolar has been advo cated in [16] , and in [5] for the possibility theory frame work. It corresponds to situations where two complete preorders, rather than one, are necessary to represent the whole information conveniently. While a consis tency condition should be maintained between them they behave in opposite ways in order to be comple � mentary. Namely, while one of the two distributions agrees with the classical logical view mentioned above the other rather corresponds to an idea of close world assumption, where only the information explicitly re ported is held for true. The latter view obeys to a max imal specifi city principle where only the worlds which are known as existing are considered to be possible. The information is then accumulated disjunctively in the sense that the larger the number of reported cases, the larger the range of worlds which are guaranteed to be possible. This bipolar framework can be of interest for modelling knowledge in order to distinguish between what is pos sible because it is just consistent with what is known, and what is possible for sure since it has been ob served. For instance, the information about the prices of houses in some area is usually partly made of gen eral rules constraining the possible prices and of ex amples of reported cases. The bipolar view is also natural when modelling preferences if we have to dis tinguish between positive desires and preferences re flecting what it is not rejected as unsatisfactory [3] .
Another situation which can lead to a bipolar repre sentation is the case where we start with a possibility distribution over a power set of possible worlds that we want to approximate from above and from below by distributions on the referential set, as explained in Section 7.
The paper aims at showing how the possibility the ory framework is convenient for handling bipolar rep resentations. The next section explains how a pair of consistent distributions, referred to as lower and upper distributions respectively, should be associated with a treatment respectively in terms of guaranteed possi bility functions (also called .6.-functions) and maximal specificity principle, and in terms of (classical) pos sibility measure II and minimal specificity principle. A joint treatment of .6, and II functions is provided, applying maximal specificity principle on .6., and min imal specificity principle on II. It is shown that the two principles are the two sides of a unique principle of minimal commitment. Section 3 summarizes logical representation results in terms of .6.-functions-based constraints and of necessity-based constraints. Sec tions 4, 5 and 6 show how the idea of conditioning, in terms of context-dependent comparative constraints, or in terms of conditional functions, can be applied to the bipolar representation framework. Section 7 pro vides an illustration of the usefulness of the proposed representation framework in diagnosis modelling. 
Constraints on a possibility distribution
The basic representational tool in possibility theory is the notion of a possibility distribution [17] , denoted by n:, which encodes a complete preorder on a referential set U of possible worlds or possible interpretations. A degree n:(u) E [0, 1] evaluates to what extent u E U can be the actual state of the world. So the larger n:(u), the greater the plausibility of u, the more normal u is, the more preferred u is, the more satisfactory u is, according to the problem under concern (knowledge or preference modelling).
A possibility distribution, representing the available information, should obey a principle of minimal speci fi city. This principle states that each possible inter pretation u should receive the largest possibility de gree in agreement with the set of constraints induced by the available information. If the available informa tion states that "the actual state of the world is in a (classical) subset A", this means that any possibil ity distribution 1r such that Vu, n:(u) ::; A(u) (we use the same notation for a subset and its characteristic function) is in accordance with the information. The information 1r :S A only rules out the values outside A which are asserted as completely impossible (since A(u) = 0 iff u tf_ A). Choosing a particular n: such that 1r < A, for representing the information, would be ar bitrarily too precise. Hence choosing the largest pos sibility distribution n:* such that n: ::; A, i.e. n:* = A, is natural. Clearly, a collection of constraints 1r ::; A; for i = 1, · · · , n should be aggregated conjunctively, i.e.,n: :S min;A;. The more constraints of this form, the more precise our information about the location of the actual state of the world. It corresponds to the situation in classical logic, where the more formu las, the smaller the set of interpretations which make them true. The full consistency of the constraints is achieved when n:* is normalized, i.e. 3u, n:*(u) = 1, which means that there remains at least one fully pos sible interpretation.
This approach extends to the case where the A; 's or A are fuzzy subsets. Let A-a= { u: A(u) >a } . Note that the A-a's are nested, i.e. a 2': j3 =} Aa-� A 13 . Then 1r :S A means that Va, Vu tf_ Aa-, n:(u) :S a, i.e. the possibility of u is upper-bounded by a. This can be translated in terms of the set of constraints '<Ia, II((Aa-)c) ::; a, where Ac is the complement of A in U and where II is a possibility measure defined from 7r by II(A) = SUPuEAn:(u), VA� U.
It can be as well stated in terms of the dual necessity measure N(A) = 1-II(N), i.e.
'<Ia, N(Aa-) 2': 1-a,
which expresses that we are certain, at least at level 1 -a, that the actual world is in A a-.
But there exists a converse type of constraint of the form 1r 2': A, which expresses that all the values in A are possible at least at the degree to which these val ues belong to A. It corresponds to a different kind of information of the type "all the values in A are pos sible" . Such a piece of information is natural when reporting on observed data whose feasibility, or possi bility of appearance is thus guaranteed. The aggrega tion of such pieces of information is disjunctive since 1r 2': Aj for j = 1, · · · , m entails 1r 2': maxi Aj and corresponds to a data accumulation process. The no tion of possibility underlying the constraint 1 r 2': A is related to a set function, denoted t.. , different from the possibility measure II. Indeed 1r 2': A means that Va,Vu E Aa,Tr(u) 2': a, i.e.
where Aa = {u: A(u) 2': a } and t.. (A) = infueA7r(u) is the minimum degree of possibility over A and is called the "guaranteed possibility" of A.
Clearly with constraints of the form 1r 2': A, we cannot apply a principle of minimal specificity (which would lead to the state of complete ignorance, Vu, 1r(u) = 1). We should rather use the converse principle of maxi mal specificity which allocates to each value its mini mum degree of possibility enforced by the constraint. ). This means that in terpretations covered by A or B are guaranteed to be possible (i.e., because they are observed, feasible, sat isfactory, permitted, according to the problems) if and only if both the interpretations in A and those in B are guaranteed to be possible.
2.2
The bipolar view
Generally, the two types of information described above may be available, namely the ones of the form 1r ::; A1 and those of the form 1r 2': A2, leading to the obvious consistency requirement 1r, = A2 ::; IT* = A1, I.e., Vu, 1r,(u)::; 1r'(u).
This agrees with the idea that what is observed is only a part of what is possible.
Thus a pair of consistent lower and upper possibility distributions IT, and IT ' , obeying to (3) can be seen as encoding two types of information of the form respec tively t.(A * ") 2': a where IT, = A,, i.e. the worlds in A,a are guaranteed to be possible at degree a on the one hand, and of the form N(Ai;-) 2': 1-a where 1r' = A*, i.e. it is certain at degree 1 -a that the actual world is in Ai;-. Given a consistent pair of possibility distributions 1r, and 7r* ( 1r. ::; IT ' ) , the uncertainty of an event A is evaluated by the ordered pair ( t.. (A),II(A)), with t.(A) ::; II(A), since t. is defined from 1r, and II from 1r*. This can be symbolically written (t.. , II)( A) = (t.. (A),II(A)). Then we have (t.. , II )( AU B)= mM((t.. , II)( A), (t.. , II)( B)), (4) where m stands for min and M for max, and 
Up to (6), the four set functions N, t., II and 'V are un related. This strongly contrasts with the probabilistic setting where only one quantity assesses the uncer tainty of A, since Prob(N) = 1-Prob(A). In general, while (4) holds for the disjunction, we only have the inequality
II( An B)::; min(II(A), II( B)),
for possibility measures, since An B may be impossible while An Be and thus A can be fully possible, as well as AcnE and thus B. A counterpart of this inequality holds for t., namely
since the minimum of 1r, over An B may be greater than the minima over A, and over B. These two in equalities can be written more compactly as (t.. , II)( An B) <:;; Mm((t.. , II)( A), (t.. , II )(B)), (7) where When (8) holds, A(A n B) (resp. II(A n B)) does not bring further information w.r.t. A(A) and A(B) (resp. II(A) and II(B)). Observe that (8) encompasses the condition II(A n B) = min(II(A), II( B)), which is a form of indepen dence between A and B, called by Nahmias [13] , "un relatedness". The corresponding form of independence for A reads, A(A n B) = max(A(A), A( B)), i.e. if A and B are unrelated, the interpretations in A and B are guaranteed to be possible as far as the inter pretations of A, or those of B, are guaranteed to be possible.
Besides, apart from '� ', there exists another natu ral partial ordering which can be introduced in the bipolar framework, that we shall denote by �' which means "less possible than", and which is defined by (A, II)( A) � (A, II)( B) iff A(A) � A(B) and II(A) � II( B). These two orderings induce a bilattice structure in the sense of Ginsberg [11] . 3 
Bipolar possibilistic logic
Lower and upper possibility distributions are not al ways directly available, but are rather implicitly spec ified by means of guaranteed possibility-based con straints and necessity-based constraints respectively. These constraints bear on sets of possible worlds which are no longer necessarily nested, as in the case of the a-level cuts of the fuzzy sets specifying the distribu tions in Section 2 .1.
In possibilistic logic [6] , the information is priori tized in terms of necessity measures. A possibilistic logic base is a set of weighted formulas of the form E = {(a;,")';l : i = 1,···,n } , where a; is a proposi tional f ormu a (which corresponds to a set of models A;) and /i belongs to a totally ordered scale such as [0, 1]. (a;, li ) means that the necessity degree of A; is at least equal to "")';, i.e. N (A;) 2: /i. With a possibilistic logic b ase E, a unique possibil ity distribution, denoted by rrr;, is associated at the semantical level; it is defined by [6] : 1:/u E U,
7l"I: u = 1 -max {"Y; : (a;, -y; ) E E and u � a; } otherwise, where rr; is in agreement with the minimal specificity principle. Indeed this is the largest possibility distri bution whose the associated necessity measure N sat isfies N (A;) 2: "")'; for all i such that (a;, 1;) E E. Besides, the inference rule (a V b, a), (�a V c, {3) f-(b V c, min( a, {3)) is the basis of the possibilistic in ference machinery at the syntactic level [6] .
In possibilistic logic each formula (a;, /i ) expresses that it is certain at level /i that the actual state of the world is among the models of a;, i.e. that the counter-models of a; are only possible at most at level 1 -"")' ;. Then a possibilistic logic base E = { (a;,"")' ;) : i = 1, · · ·, n} is associated with the upper possibility distribution rr; defined above.
Another type of information is encoded by constraints of the form A(Bj) 2: Jj for asserting that any model of a proposition bj, whose set of models is Bj, is a possible candidate for being the actual world at least at level Jj. 4 
Bipolar conditioning
A conditional possibility measure II(. I A) has been defined by Risdal [12] as satisfying the Bayes-like re lationship:
II( An B)= min(II(B I A), II(A)). (9)
The principle of minimal specificity leads to define II(. I A) as the greatest solution of this equation, namely, if A=/= 0: Conditioning can be also defined for guaranteed pos sibility measures. As for the inference, it works in a reversed way w.r.t. II. Namely, conditioning obeys the following equation In a qualitative setting, a possibility distribution 71' can be represented by its well-ordered partition WOP(11') = E1 U · · · UEn such that: E1 U · · · UEn = U, E;nEj = 0, and Vu, u', 11'(u) > 11'(u') iff u E E;, u' E Ej and i <j.
Each strict comparative possibility base P induces a unique upper qualitative possibility distribution WOP(11'p) obtained by considering the least specifi c solution satisfying:
for all ak -+ bk of P.
In [4] , an algorithm has been provided to compute WOP(11'p ) = E1 U · · · UEn . Here we only recall its basic principle, which consists in putting each interpretation in the lowest possible rank (or highest possibility de gree) without violating constraints (12) . The only case where we cannot put u in some partition E;, is when u is in the right part of some constraint (where there is a rule ak -+ bk such that u f= ak 1\ � h ) , and none of the interpretations of the left part of this constraint (i.e., u f= ak 1\bk) is already classified in some Ej with j < i. Therefore WOP(11'p) is computed as follows: for each step i, we put in E; all interpretations which are not in the right part of any constraint, then we remove all rules ak -t bk such that there exists at least u in E; such that u f= ak II bk.
There exists a converse transformation from 71' to P, see [2] .
Similarly, a set of �-based comparative constraints �(Ak n Bk) > �(Ak n B;;) defines a lower qualita tive possibility distribution by applying the maximal specificity principle. Let G = { ak ,._... bk : k = 1, · · · , n} be a set of rules. Let us denote by C= {�(Ak n Bk) > �(Ak n Bk) : ak ,._... bk E G} the set of �-based comparative con straints induced by G. Algorithm 1 provides the most specific qualitative distribution satisfying G, denoted by WOP (11'a) .
The idea of the algorithm consists in assigning to each interpretation the lowest possibility degree. At each
while (U # 0) do
-Remove from U elements of S;; -Remove from C constraints such that S;n(AknB%) /;0 return E1, · · ·, E; s.t. Vj::; i, Ej = Si -j+l end step i, we put in S; the interpretations which are not in left part of any Ll-based constraint Ll(Ak n Bk) > Ll ( Ak n B%) (otherwise such a constraint will be falsi fied). For instance, the least plausible interpretations are those which do not verify any Ll-rule (namely, are not in any Ak n Bk) · Example 1 Let us consider an example where G = { p "-' q, p "-' ..,r,q"" r}, and p,q,r are three proposi tional symbols. Let U = { w0 = pqr, w1 = pq..,r, w2 = p..,qr, wa = p..,q..,r, w4 = -,pqr, ws = ..,pq..,r, w6 ..,p..,qr, wr = ..,p..,q..,r}. Let us apply our previous algorithm. We have: C= Ll( {wa, wl}) > Ll({w2,w3}), Ll({wl, wa}) > Ll({w a , w2}), Ll( {wa, w4}) > Ll( {w!, ws} ) } . The use of maximal specificity principle leads to first put W6, W7, w2 and w5 in the lowest rank since they are not constrained, namely from our algorithm, we have: S1 = {w6,W7,W2,W5} · Once S1 is settled, all the constraints in C are satisfied, hence s2 contains the remaining interpretations. Hence, the partition associated to G is: E1 = {wo,w1, ws, w4} and E2 = {w2,ws,w6,w7} .
A syntactic counterpart of the above algorithm where G would be directly encoded in terms of Ll-based for mulas, can be provided by taking advantages of trans formations between the different representations of a possibility distribution [2] . Its computational com plexity is not more costly than the one used to trans form a strict comparative possibility base into a pos sibilistic logic base [4] . 6 
Possibilistic networks
Another compact representation of a possibility distri bution is graphical and is based on conditioning. Symbolic knowledge is represented by DAGs, where nodes represent variables (in this paper, we assume that they are binary), and edges express influence links between variables. When there exists a link from X to Y, X is said to be a parent of Y. The set of parents of a given node X is denoted by Par(X). By the capital letter X we denote a variable which represents either the symbol x or its negation. An interpretation in this section will be simply denoted by X1 · · ·Xn. Uncer tainty is expressed at each node by a pair of lower and upper possibility distributions as follows: -For root nodes X; we provide the prior pos sibility degrees and guaranteed possibility degrees (Ll(X;), II(X;)) of x; and of its negation ..,x;. These prior should satisfy the normalization condition: max(IT(x;), II(..,x;)) = 1. The normalization condi tion min(Ll(x;), Ll(-,x;)) = 0 is assumed for guaran teed possibility degrees.
-For other nodes Xj, we provide (Ll(X; I Par(X;)), IT(X; I Par(X;))) i.e. the conditional possi bility degrees and guaranteed possibility degrees of xi and of its negation ..,x j given any complete instantia tion of each variable of parents of Xj, UPar(X;). The conditional possibilities should also satisfy the normal ization conditions: max(IT(xj I UPar(X;)) ,II(-,xj I UPar(X;J)) = 1 . min(Ll(Xj I UPar(X1j) ,Ll(-,xj I UPar(X;J)) = 0. The local possibilities (Ll(X;), II(X;)) (resp. (Ll(X; I Par(X;)), II(X; I Par(X;)) should satisfy the coher ence conditions:
Ll(X;) ::; II(X;) (resp. Ll(X; I Par(X;))::; II(X; I Par(X;))).
A first approach to defining a pair of joint distributions associated with a bipolar possibilistic graph is to apply the following rules: rr*(u) = min { IT(x I UPar(XJ): u f= x and u F UPar(XJ}, (13) rr.(u) = max{Ll(x I UPar(XJ) : u f= x and u f= UPar(X)}.
Example 2 Let us consider the following graph. We have: (Ll(xl) = 0, II( xi) = . 5), (Ll(x2) = O,II(x2) = 1 ), (Ll( -, x !) = .45,Il(-,x!) = 1), (Ll(..,x2) = .4, II(-,x2) == .5). Table 1 gives the conditional possibilities (Ll(Xs I X1X2) , II(Xsl X1X2)). Table 2 shows the possibility distributions rr * and 1!" • associated with the graph. 
.5 .45
•Xt..., X2X3
•XtX2..,X3
.45
-,X1X2X3
.
. 45
Xt•X2'X3
.5 .4
X1-,X2X3
XJX2-,X3
.5 0
X1X2X3
.5 .4 Table 2 :
It is easy to check that 'v'u, 1r.(u)::::; 1r*(u). However, the coherence property is not a! ways guar anteed. Indeed, consider a bipolar possibilistic graph composed of two distinct nodes X and Y, such that:
We have 1r*( x y) = .3 while 1r.(xy) = .5. One way to guarantee that 1r. ::::; 7r* is to replace (14) by:
the attribute when the cause takes place. Possibil ity distributions on a power set are heavy to handle and can be then approximated by a consistent pair of distributions on the domain we start with [7] . In prac tice, this means that a lower distribution describes the set of values which are possible effects more or less certainly, i.e. which are guaranteed as being possible effects, while the upper distribution restricts the val ues which are not impossible to some extent as being possible effects . Let 1r�. and 1r�• be the lower and upper distributions representing what is known of the effects of c on at tribute i. Given an observation of the value of at tribute i, which may be pervaded with imprecision and uncertainty, represented by a fuzzy set 0;, two indices can be computed for rank-ordering the causes according to their likelihood of presence. Namely, the consistency index of c with the observation defined by
evaluates to what extent there exists a value compat ible with the observation which is not impossible for i when c takes place.
Another index of relevance of c w.r.t. the observation can be defined as Diagnosis knowledge can be described by means of re lations between causes and effects [14] . The effects of a cause c usually pertain to several attributes describing the system under consideration. On a given attribute, the possible effects of c are usually represented by a subset of possible values rather than a single value.
For instance, we may have the rule "if you have a fl u, your fever is in the interval [38.5 , 40]°C". If we assume that our information is complete on the possible effects of a fl u on the fever, it means that both i) any fever outside [38. Thus, clearly the relevance index is such that �e( 0;) ::S lie ( 0;), and thus refi nes the first one. Besides, from (11), we can write the Bayesian-like equation Suppose our knowledge about possible effects is un-Mm((C.,TI)(A I B),(C.,TI)(B)) = Mm((C.,TI)(B I A),(C.,TI)(A)). certain rather than complete. Then, we have to use a In case of empty prior (�, II)( B) = (0, 1), and using a distribution on the power set of the attribute domain.
postulate of "observation relevance" [9] stating that In the possibilistic framework this distribution will enm M((�, II)( A I B), (�, II)( A I B e ))= (0, 1) , code that some subsets are more plausible than others it can be shown that (�, II)(B I A) behaves like for describing the exact subset of possible values for (�, II)( A I B). This provides a justifi cation for using (�c, llc)(O;) for estimating the plausibility of having cause c given 0;. 8 
Conclusion
This paper has presented and advocated a twofold framework for representing uncertainty qualitatively. This can be useful for knowledge representation as well as preference representation. The bipolarity enables us to distinguish between what is possible or satisfactory for sure from what is just not impossible, or not unde sirable.
It has been recently shown that bipolar possibilistic logic provides a natural framework for representing positive and negative desires [3] . Indeed, negative desires which refer to what is more or less rejected by an agent, correspond to constraints of the form TI(Rk) ::; Pk. They express that the models of Rk are considered as rather impossible. Positive desires are represented by constraints of the form �(Dj) 2': Jj, which expresses that any model of dj is satisfactory at least at level Jj. This representation framework has been applied in [3] for fusing the positive and nega tive preferences of different agents. Even if the prefer ences of each agent t are consistent in the sense that Vu, 1r� ::; 1r 1* , it may occur, that the result of the fu sion of the lower distributions is no longer consistent with the result of the fusion of the upper distributions, indeed the same aggregation operator is not used for fusing the positive preferences represented by 1r� on the one hand, and the non-rejection-based preferences encoded by 1r 1 * on the other hand. Then a revision step should take place for enforcing the consistency.
Besides, a possibility distribution can be represented equivalently in various compact frameworks: as a pos sibilistic logic base, as a possibilistic graph, or as strict comparative possibility constraints. This has been ex tended to the bipolar setting, by first defining the idea of conditioning (underlying the two last compact rep resentation frameworks listed above) for guaranteed possibility measures. Algorithms exist for going di rectly from one compact representation to another [21. They can be adapted to the bipolar framework. Ef ficient algorithms recently developed for uncertainty propagation in possibilistic graphs [1] could be ex tended to bipolar possi bilistic graphs as well. Lastly, the bilattice structure [11] of the bipolar frame work is worth investigating and may be of interest, especially in the view of developin � possibilistic logic programming, following Fitting [10j's approach.
